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SUMMUM V. PLEASANT GROVE CITY. THE TENTH CIRCUIT
"BINDS THE HANDS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AS THEY
SHAPE THE PERMANENT CHARACTER OF THEIR PUBLIC
SPACES"'
INTRODUCTION
In Summum v. Pleasant Grove City,2 the Tenth Circuit held that a
content-based regulation on permanent monuments in a public park must
satisfy strict scrutiny in order to survive a Free Speech challenge.3 In so
ruling, the Tenth Circuit held that permanent monuments in public parks
are traditional public forums.4 However, while parks are traditional pub-
lic forums because they "have immemorially been ... used for purposes
of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions," 5 they are not traditional public forums "insofar as the
placement of monuments is concerned.",6 In finding that the appropriate
forum in Pleasant Grove City was a traditionally public one, the Tenth
Circuit incorrectly focused on the government property at issue without
considering how the "particular channel of communication" to which
access was sought affected the nature of that property.7 Had the Tenth
Circuit done this, it would have found that a display of monuments in a
public park is a limited public forum and therefore, a content-based regu-
lation need only satisfy a reasonableness test to survive a Free Speech
challenge. 8
The precedent set in Summum v. Pleasant Grove City takes away
the government's ability to control what monuments it allows in public
parks. By ruling public parks are traditional public forums irrespective
of the particular channel of communication sought, the Tenth Circuit
leaves the government with an all-or-nothing choice when it comes to
placing monuments in public parks. The government must either pro-
hibit all monuments or allow all monuments unconditionally. This
choice is really no choice at all when one recognizes that the government
would be foolish to open a public park to any monument knowing that it
has no ability to deny other monuments.
1. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d 1170, 1174 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
2. 483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007).
3. Id. at 1051-52.
4. Id. at 1050 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983)).
5. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
6. Summum, 499 F.3d at 1173 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
7. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985).
8. Id. at 806.
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Underlying Summum v. Pleasant Grove City is the Tenth Circuit's
inability to recognize a distinction between temporary and permanent
speech when defining a forum. While temporary speech (e.g., protests,
lectures, and demonstrations) occurs for a few hours, a few days, or
maybe even a few weeks, permanent speech (i.e., monuments) occurs
from the moment it starts for so long as the forum exists. Because of
this, government must have the ability to limit permanent speech in any
forum if for no other reason than for preserving property. As such, any
forum in which there is permanent speech will have to be a limited pub-
lic forum with regards to all other permanent speech. Unfortunately, the
Tenth Circuit failed to recognize this speech distinction and need for a
limiting factor in Summum v. Pleasant Grove City and decided that a
display of monuments in a public park was a traditional public forum
merely because a public park is treated as a traditional public forum with
regards to temporary speech. This failure risks parks becoming so clut-
tered with monuments that they become little more than glorified junk-
yards bursting at the seems.
Part I of this comment discusses traditional public forums, desig-
nated public forums, limited public forums, and nonpublic forums. Part
II discusses Summum v. Pleasant Grove City as well as the history and
cases before it. Part III discusses cases from the Ninth, Second, and Sev-
enth Circuits, all of which recognize that monuments should be consid-
ered separate from temporary speech when defining their forum. Part IV
analyzes the Tenth Circuit's decision in Summum v. Pleasant Grove City
and argues that a display of permanent monuments in a public park is a
limited public forum. Finally, this comment concludes by recommend-
ing guidelines to ensure that a content-based regulation in a limited pub-
lic forum satisfies the reasonableness test.
I. BACKGROUND9
Within the First Amendment, the Free Speech Clause states that
"Congress shall make no law .. .abridging the freedom of speech."' 0
Whether speech relates to open political discussion, the marketplace of
ideas, individual expression, tolerance, or other activities, the right is a
fundamental one protected by the Constitution.1" As such, the Free
9. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1123-44 (Aspen Publishers, 3rd ed. 2006); Seth D. Rogers, A Forum by Any Other Name... Would
Be Just as Confusing: The Tenth Circuit Dismisses Intent from the Public Forum. First Unitarian
Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2002), 4 WYO. L. REV. 753, 762-71
(2004); Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the
Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1715 (1987).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 925-30.
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Speech Clause prohibits government from censoring speech "because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content.'0
2
However, "speech often requires a place for it to occur."1 3  Most
people do not have access to television, radio, or newspapers to broad-
cast their message. Rather, they rely on access to government property
to assemble and communicate their message.' 4 But, the Supreme Court
holds that the "First Amendment does not guarantee access to property
simply because it is owned or controlled by the government."' 5 Instead,
certain government properties are allocated as forums for speech. The
Supreme Court holds that there are four types of government property:
traditional public forums, designated public forums, limited public fo-
rums, and nonpublic forums. 16 The Court further holds that the constitu-
tionality of a regulation of speech depends on the forum and the nature of
the government's action.
1 7
A. Traditional Public Forum
A traditional public forum is government property that is open to all
speech activities.' 8 In other words, traditional public forums exist, have
always existed, and will always exist for the directed purpose of Free
Speech activities. Streets and parks are examples of traditional public
forums. One of the earliest cases discussing Free Speech and a tradi-
tional public forum was Hague v. CIO. 19 In Hague, a labor organization
challenged a city law that prevented the organization from holding meet-
ings in public places.20  Ruling in favor of the labor organization, the
Court held that "such use of the streets and public places has, from an-
cient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties
of citizens."'al This concept has been reiterated time and again,22 most
notably in Perry Educational Association v. Perry Local Educators' As-
12. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972). There are obvious ex-
ceptions to the type of speech that is protected. For example, speech intended to incite or intimidate
is not protected under the Free Speech Clause. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49
(1969) (holding Free Speech does not permit advocacy directed to incite imminent lawless action
that is likely to incite such action); see also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 367-68 (2003) (holding
cross burning done with intent to intimidate was not protected under Free Speech Clause).
13. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 1123.
14. Id.
15. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civil Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129
(1981).
16. Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
17. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 1127.
18. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 667 (1998); Rogers, supra note
9, at 762.
19. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
20. Id. at 500-01.
21. Id. at 515; see also Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939) (holding as uncon-
stitutional an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of leaflets on public sidewalks).
22. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951); Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
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sociation,23 when the Court characterized streets and parks as "quintes-
sential public forums" because they are places "which have immemori-
ally been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts be-
tween citizens, and discussing public questions."
24
Because a traditional public forum exists for the purpose of acting
as a venue for demonstrations, rallies, and other speech activities, the
Court looks unfavorably at any government regulation prohibiting speech
in a traditional public forum.25  The Supreme Court holds that govern-
ment may enforce a content-based regulation in a traditional public fo-
rum only when its reasons for doing so meet strict scrutiny.26
A government regulation is content-based when it discriminates as
to either viewpoint or subject matter.27 Viewpoint discrimination occurs
when the government regulates speech based on "the ideology of the
message. 28 Subject matter discrimination occurs when the government
regulates speech based on the topic of the speech.29 Once the Court finds
that a regulation is content-based, the regulation must satisfy strict scru-
tiny to be upheld.30 In order to meet strict scrutiny, the government must
prove that the regulation is "necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.",3' The Supreme Court
has never found a content-based regulation on Free Speech to satisfy
strict scrutiny.32 For example, in Schneider v. State of New Jersey,33 the
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a city ordinance that prohibited
the distribution of leaflets on public property.34 The Court held that the
city's interest in reducing litter and preserving the aesthetic value of its
23. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
24. Id. at 46-47 (holding that internal school mailing system was a limited public forum).
Although the Court in Perry did not deal with a traditional public forum, it is considered the Court's
leading authority discussing all three forums.
25. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 1126.
26. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
27. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 932-33.
28. Id. at 934; see Amy Sabrin, Thinking About Content: Can It Play an Appropriate Role in
Government Funding of the Arts?, 102 YALE L. J. 1209, 1220 (1993); see, e.g., Boos v. Berry, 485
U.S. 312, 317 (1988) (declaring unconstitutional a District of Columbia regulation prohibiting the
display of signs criticizing foreign countries within 500 feet of any embassy). Here, the Court held
that the regulation was viewpoint discrimination because it drew a distinction between what you
could and could not say about foreign governments.
29. Sabrin, supra note 28, at 1217; see, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980)
(declaring unconstitutional a Chicago regulation prohibiting all picketing in residential neighbor-
hoods unless the picketing involved a labor dispute). Here, the Court reasoned that the regulation
was subject matter discrimination because it allowed speech so long as the topic concerned labor and
employment, but not otherwise.
30. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
31. Id. at45.
32. The Court has some times found seemingly content-based regulations to be content-
neutral. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 724 (2000) (upholding regulation on protests outside
abortion clinics as content-neutral); see also Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)
(upholding zoning ordinance that prohibited adult movie theatres as content-neutral).
33. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
34. Id. at 163.
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streets was not sufficiently compelling to prohibit "a person rightfully on
a public street from handing literature to one willing to receive it."
35
B. Nonpublic Forum
A nonpublic forum is government property that is closed to all
speech activities. 36 For example, in Adderly v. Florida,37 the Supreme
Court held that the government could prohibit protesting outside of jails
and prisons.38 In upholding the convictions of protestors outside a jail
who refused to disperse, the Court declared that, "[t]he State, no less than
a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its
control for the use which it is lawfully dedicated., 39 Similarly, in Greer
v. Spock,40 the Court held that a military base was a nonpublic forum
even though areas inside the base, such as walkways and parks, were
open for public use because "it is the business of a military installation
... to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum.'
'4
C. Designated Public Forum and Limited Public Forum
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the government can take a
nonpublic forum and turn it into a public forum.42 When the government
affirmatively acts in a way in which it opens nonpublic property for
speech activities, it creates either a designated public forum or a limited
public forum.43
It is important to distinguish a traditional public forum from a des-
ignated public forum and a limited public forum. A traditional public
forum exists for all speech activities notwithstanding any government act
while a designated public forum and a limited public forum only exist
after the government has taken some kind of affirmative act allowing
speech activities. 44 In other words, whereas a traditional public forum is
always open for speech activities, if the government does not take an
affirmative action to create a designated public forum or a limited public
forum, that property remains a nonpublic forum closed to all speech ac-
tivities.
35. Id. at 162.
36. Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
37. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
38. Id. at 47-48; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 1139 (discussing nonpublic forum).
39. Adderly, 385 U.S. at 47.
40. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
41. Id. at 838.
42. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
43. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
44. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 1137-38.
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Because the property in a designated public forum and a limited
public forum is initially nonpublic, the government may control or limit
the kind of speech allowed on this property.45
When the government opens nonpublic property to all speech activi-
ties it creates a designated public forum.46 Because a designated public
forum is opened for all speech activities, it is treated the same as a tradi-
tional public forum, namely, a content-based regulation must satisfy
strict scrutiny to be upheld by the Court.47
However, when the government only opens nonpublic property to
certain speech activities, it creates a limited public forum.48 Unlike a
designated public forum where property is opened to all speech and
thereafter all speech must be allowed, property in a limited public forum
is opened only to certain speech and thereafter all similar speech must be
allowed. However, dissimilar speech may still be prohibited because it
was never affirmatively authorized in the first place.
The Supreme Court has held that a content-based regulation in a
limited public forum will be upheld so long as it satisfies a reasonable-
ness test.4 9 A reasonableness test is met when the regulation is reason-
able in light of a government interest and does not discriminate as to
viewpoint.50 In other words, in a limited public forum, the Court allows
subject matter discrimination but not viewpoint discrimination. 5' For
instance, the Court in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund, Inc.,52 stated that "[c]ontrol over access to a nonpublic fo-
rum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the
distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum and are viewpoint neutral. '' 53  Cornelius is important because it
recognizes that when the government opens property for speech activi-
ties, that property does not automatically get treated like a traditional
public forum where strict scrutiny applies. Rather, the government can
impose limits on the type of speech permitted. These limits will be
45. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995); Perry,
460 U.S. at 46 n.7.
49. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. While the Supreme Court initially applied strict scrutiny to a
content-based restriction in a limited public forum, Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981)
(holding unconstitutional a policy opening campus facilities to student organizations other than
religiously based ones), review of more recent Supreme Court cases shows that the Court now ap-
plies a reasonableness test to a Free Speech regulation in a limited public forum. See also Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985); Good News Club v. Mil-
ford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001) (holding that denying religious group access to after
school activities was viewpoint discrimination).
50. GoodNews Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07.
51. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809.
52. 473 U.S. 788.
53. Id. at 806.
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evaluated by the Court under a reasonableness test that allows content
discrimination.54
However, the Court emphasizes that while content discrimination is
permissible in a limited public forum, viewpoint discrimination is not. In
Good News Club v. Milford Central School,55 the Court held that a pro-
hibition on speech in a limited public forum was unconstitutional be-
cause it did not pass the reasonableness test.56  Here, a town statute
opened its school for use by clubs and organizations that promoted well-
being in children. 7 Good News Club, a private Christian organization,
sued Milford School alleging that its Free Speech rights had been vio-
lated after the club was denied access to the school.58 Finding in favor of
Good News Club, the Court stated that while government may be justi-
fied "in reserving [its forum] for certain groups or for the discussion of
certain topics, ' '59 "the restriction must not discriminate against speech on
the basis of viewpoint, and the restriction must be 'reasonable in light of
the purpose served by the forum."' 60  The Court then stated that the
school's purported reason for denying Good News Club access to the
school-that it did not promote well-being in children-was a fagade for
viewpoint discrimination and therefore failed the reasonableness test.
61
II. SUMMUM V. PLEASANT GROVE CITY
A. Historical Background and Precursor Cases
In the 1950's and 1960's, the Fraternal Order of Eagles ("Eagles")
donated several granite monuments of the Ten Commandments to towns
and cities across the United States.62 The monuments were erected on
government property.63  Thereafter, municipalities that received and
erected these monuments faced continued challenges from religious
groups, civil liberties organizations, and individuals alike who argued
that the monuments violated the United States Constitution's Establish-
ment Clause. 64 Opponents of the Ten Commandments monuments ar-
54. Id.
55. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
56. Id. at 107.
57. Id. at 108.
58. Id. at 103-04.
59. Id. at 106 (alteration in original) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)).
60. Id. at 106-07 (citation omitted) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
61. Id. at 108-09.
62. Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995,998 (10th Cir. 2002).
63. Keith T. Peters, Note, Small Town Establishment of Religion in ACLU of Nebraska Foun-
dation v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005); Eagles Soaring in the Eight Circuit, 84
NEB. L. REv. 997, 1000; see also Books v. City of Elkhart, Indiana 235 F.3d 292, 295-97 (7th Cir.
2000); Summon v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906,909 (10th Cir. 1997).
64. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682 (2005); McCreary County v. ACLU, 545
U.S. 844, 844 (2005).
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gued that the monuments purported to establish a religion or religious
form of government, while proponents of the monuments argued that
they served a valid secular purpose as a history lesson in the foundation
of laws of American government or "in recognizing and commending the
Eagles for their efforts to reduce juvenile delinquency.,
65
Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp.,6 6 the first Tenth Circuit case in-
volving a Ten Commandments monument on government property, was
an Establishment Clause challenge. In Anderson, a group of Utah citi-
zens challenged an Eagles' Ten Commandments monument that had
been erected on property outside a courthouse as government promotion
of religion. 67 Finding against the citizens, the Tenth Circuit held that the
monument did not violate the Establishment Clause because it was pri-
marily secular.68
After Anderson, Summum, a religious organization based in Utah,
tried to erect its own monuments on the same government properties that
had erected Ten Commandments monuments. 69 Summum reasoned that
because the government had opened properties to the display of religious
monuments, and that these monuments were permissible so long as they
were primarily secular, there was no reason that a Summum monument
should not be allowed onto these properties so long as they were also
primarily secular.7° When requests to erect its monuments were denied,
Summum challenged these denials as Free Speech violations. 7'
In Summum v. Callaghan,72 Summum argued that Salt Lake City
had violated its Free Speech rights after the city council denied a Sum-
mum request to erect one of its monuments next to the aforementioned
Eagles' monument.73 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that Salt Lake
65. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 682; see also Peters, supra note 63, at 999-1000 (discussing
Eagles' Ten Commandments monuments and the Establishment Clause).
66. 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1973).
67. Id. at 30.
68. Id. at 33-34 (holding that the Ten Commandments Monument did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause because the monument was primarily secular and religiously passive). Anderson
has received much criticism but has never been overturned. Because the Tenth Circuit holds that the
Eagles' Ten Commandments Monument is primarily secular, I will more often than not refer to it as
the Eagles' Monument rather than the Ten Commandments Monument or the Eagles' Ten Com-
mandments Monument. My intention in doing this is to have the reader view the Eagles' Monument
as a secular one, as Anderson instructs, rather than a religious one, a distinction that is beyond the
scope of this comment.
69. E.g., Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 997-98 (10th Cir. 2002); Summum v.
Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1997).
70. See City of Ogden, 297 F.3d at 999, 1011; Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 910.
71. See City of Ogden, 297 F.3d at 999; Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 910.
72. 130 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 1997).
73. Id. at 909-10. Summum is a religion and philosophy that began in 1975 as a result of
Claude "Corky" Nowell's encounter with beings he describes as "Summa Individuals." According
to Nowell, these beings presented him with concepts regarding the nature of creation, concepts that
have always existed and are continually reintroduced to humankind by advanced beings who work
along the pathways of creation. As a result of his experience, Nowell founded Summum in order to
share the "gift" he received with others. Summum.us, Welcome to Summum!,
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City had created a limited public forum for permanent monuments when
it permitted the Eagles' monument on its courthouse lawn.74 The court
further stated that a limited public forum is a type of nonpublic forum
and therefore "control over access.., can be based on subject matter and
speaker identity so long as the distinctions ... are reasonable ... and are
viewpoint neutral. 75
The Tenth Circuit, however, reversed and remanded the lower
court's decision dismissing Summum's complaint, holding that Salt Lake
City's denial of the Summum monument may not have been viewpoint
neutral. 76 The court held that Salt Lake City's lack of standards for de-
termining access to its forum "made it far too easy for officials to use
'post hoc rationalizations' and 'shifting or illegitimate criteria' to justify
their behavior, and thus make it difficult for courts to determine whether
an official has engaged in viewpoint discrimination. 77 The court further
found that the city's shifting positions for denying Summum's monu-
ment-that the courthouse lawn was being reserved for construction of a
jail; that the lawn was being preserved for aesthetic values; and that ac-
cess was only given to monuments with historical significance to the
city-indicated a pretext for viewpoint discrimination.78
In 2002, a similar challenge arose in Summum v. City of Ogden.
79
In City of Ogden, Summum requested that the city install a Summum
monument next to an Eagles' monument that had already been installed
amongst several historical markers on a lawn outside a city municipal
building.80 After the city of Ogden denied this request, Summum sued
for violation of its Free Speech rights.8!
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit stated that determining the relevant fo-
rum requires consideration of "(1) the government property to which
http://www.summum.us/about/welcome.shtml (last visited Feb. 4, 2008). The proposed monument
at issue here is a "Seven Aphorisms of Summum" Monument. Summum contends that Moses de-
scended from Mount Sinai with a tablet evoking the Seven Aphorisms in addition to the tablet evok-
ing the Ten Commandments. Summum.us, The Aphorisms of Summum and the Ten Command-
ments, http://www.summum.us/philosophy/tencommandments.shtml (last visited Feb. 2, 2008). The
Seven Aphorisms are: Psychokinesis; Correspondence; Vibration; Opposition; Rhythm; Cause and
Effect; and Gender. Summum.us, Seven Summum Principles,
http://www.summum.us/philosophy/principles.shtm (last visited Feb. 2, 2008). Summum's pro-
posed monument would display these aphorisms. Summum.us, Help Us to Support Freedom of
Speech and Prevent Discrimination, http://www.sunimum.us/about/freespeech.shtml (last visited
Feb. 2, 2008).
74. Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 919.
75. Id. at 916 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
806 (1985)).
76. Id. at 921-22.
77. Id. at 920 (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758
(1988)).
78. Id.
79. 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002).
80. Id. at 997-98. The Eagles' monument was surrounded by a police officer memorial, a
sister city tree and plaque, and various other historical markers. Id. at 998.
81. Id. at 999.
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access is sought and (2) the type of access sought.,82 In City of Ogden,
the access sought was "not merely to converse or post temporary signs
on the lawn, but the right to place permanent monuments on the lawn
... .,83 Thus, the Tenth Circuit found, as in Callaghan, that the city of
Ogden had created a limited public forum for permanent monuments
when it permitted the Eagles' monument and other historical markers on
municipal grounds.84
However, just as it had done in Callaghan, the Tenth Circuit re-
versed and remanded the case back to the lower court, holding that the
city of Ogden's denial of Summum's monument may not have been
viewpoint neutral.85  The Tenth Circuit stated that while the city of
Ogden's criterion for allowing access to its municipal grounds-allowing
only those monuments that had historical relevance to the city-may have
been acceptable, "Ogden failed to employ adequate safeguards to ensure
that the 'historical relevance' criterion did not devolve into a ... fagade
for viewpoint discrimination., 86 The court further stated that in order to
comply with the Free Speech Clause, a municipality should employ writ-
ten guidelines or, short of this, a well-established practice for determin-
ing which monuments to erect on municipal grounds. 87 The court con-
cluded that because the city of Ogden had no written guidelines and there
was scant evidence of an established practice of a "historical relevance
criterion," there was insufficient support to convince the Tenth Circuit
that there was not impropriety in Ogden's decision to reject Summum's
monument.S8
In both Callaghan and City of Ogden, the Tenth Circuit acknowl-
edged that it will apply a reasonableness test to a content-based regula-
tion on Free Speech in a limited public forum, but it also stressed that it
will pay close attention to anything that may be a fagade for viewpoint
discrimination.89 In Callaghan, the Tenth Circuit was suspicious of
viewpoint discrimination because the government had no established
criteria for determining what kinds of monuments were allowed in the
forum.90 In City of Ogden, the Tenth Circuit was suspicious of viewpoint
discrimination because the government's criteria for determining what
kinds of monuments were allowed in the forum-that they be historically
relevant to the city-appeared to have been created after the government
82. Id. at 1001-02 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 800-02 (1985)).
83. Id at 1002.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 999, 1012.
86. Id. at 1006.
87. Id at 1007.
88. Id. at 1008-09.
89. Id. at 1002-03, 1006; Sunmurn v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 914, 920 (10th Cir. 1997)
(citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 811 (1985)).
90. Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 920.
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had already denied Summum's monument rather than criteria already in
place prior to the denial of Summum's monument.
91
Callaghan and City of Ogden are important because they create a
balancing test when it comes to the placement of monuments on gov-
ernment property. This balancing test allows the government to put limi-
tations on the kinds of monuments allowed on nonpublic property so
long as the government implements specific guidelines or safeguards to
prevent viewpoint discrimination. These guidelines are to be followed
anytime a person or group requests that a monument be erected on gov-
ernment property.
But, both Callaghan and City of Ogden were cases that involved
nonpublic forums that had been turned into limited public forums by the
government. In Summum v. Pleasant Grove City,92 the Tenth Circuit
dealt with the placement of monuments in a traditional public forum.
B. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City: Facts and Procedural History
In September 2003, Summum sent the mayor of Pleasant Grove
City a letter requesting permission to erect a monument containing the
Seven Aphorisms93 of Summum in Pleasant Grove City's Pioneer Park.94
In its letter, Summum stated that its monument would be similar in size
and nature to the Eagles' monument already in Pioneer Park.95  The
Mayor of Pleasant Grove City denied Summum's request, stating that all
permanent displays in its park must "directly relate to the history of
Pleasant Grove" or be "donated by groups with long-standing ties to the
Pleasant Grove community. 96  Pleasant Grove City codified this re-
quirement after Summum's request.97
In 2005, Summum renewed its request to install its monument in
Pioneer Park.98 When the city failed to respond to its request, Summnum
sued Pleasant Grove City for violation of Summum's First Amendment
rights, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, installation of Sum-
mum's monument in Pioneer Park, and monetary damages. 99 In its com-
91. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d at 1006-08.
92. 483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007).
93. See supra note 73.
94. Pleasant Grove, 483 F.3d at 1047.
95. Id.
96. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Beside the Eagles' Monument, other structures in
Pioneer Park are: the Old School Bell; the Log Cabin; the Well; the Granary; the Nauvoo Temple
Stone; the Town Hall; the Winter Stable; the Gazebo; the Fire Shed; the 9/11 Monument; the Ginko
Tree; and the Old Mill Stone. Brief of Appellees at 5-7, Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d
1044 (No. 06-4057).
97. Pleasant Grove, 483 F.3d at 1047.
98. Id.
99. Id. Summum filed its suit in Utah District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Civil Action
for Deprivation of Rights. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (2008); Pleasant Grove, 483 F.3d at 1046-47. Sum-
mum also filed suit for violation of Utah's constitutional free expression and establishment provi-
sions. Id. at 1047. Summum subsequently dropped these allegations. Id. at 1248 n.3.
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plaint, Summum contended that its Free Speech rights were violated
when its monument was excluded from Pioneer Park while other monu-
ments were allowed access.'
00
At the preliminary injunction hearing, "the District Court indicated
that Summum would not prevail on the merits if Pleasant Grove proved it
had a well-established policy for evaluating proposed monuments that
was reasonable and viewpoint neutral."' 0 ' The Utah District Court then
denied Summum's preliminary injunction request, holding that because
"the facts regarding the city's policy ... were in dispute ... Summum
had not established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits."
' 0 2
C. Judge Tacha's Majority Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit, in a 2-1 vote, reversed the district
court's preliminary injunction denial.
10 3
The Tenth Circuit found that the display of monuments in Pioneer
Park was a traditional public forum.' 0 4 The Tenth Circuit stated, "[T[he
Supreme Court has characterized streets and parks as 'quintessential pub-
lic forums' because people have traditionally gathered in these places to
exchange ideas and engage in public debate."'15 The Tenth Circuit fur-
ther noted, "[T]he fact that Summum seeks access to... the display of a
monument ... is relevant in defining the forum, but it does not determine
the nature of the forum."' 1 6 The Tenth Circuit then distinguished Pio-
neer Park from the property in Callaghan and City of Ogden, stating that
the property in both Callaghan and City of Ogden "was not by tradition
or designation a forum for public communication," while the property in
Pleasant Grove City was. 10 7 After this, the Tenth Circuit concluded that,
because Pioneer Park was a public park and a public park is open to all
speech activities despite an affirmative government act, all speech activi-
ties within Pioneer Park had to be treated with regard to a traditional
public forum irrespective of the use for which access was sought.
0 8
The Tenth Circuit stated that the Utah District Court erred when it
found that the forum in Pleasant Grove City was a nonpublic one.'0 9
Because Pioneer Park is a public park, and public parks are always tradi-
100. Id. at 1047.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1057.
104. Id. at 1050.
105. Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(citation omitted)).
106. Id. at 1051 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985)).
107. Id. (quoting Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1002 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
108. See id. at 1050-52.
109. Id. at 1051.
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tional public forums, the Utah District Court should have found that Pio-
neer Park was a traditional public forum.' 10
Moreover, because Pioneer Park was not a nonpublic forum that had
been turned into a limited public forum but rather a traditional public
forum, the Utah District Court should have applied strict scrutiny to
Pleasant Grove City's denial of Summum's monument instead of a rea-
sonableness test.'* As such, Pleasant Grove City's denial of Surnmum's
monument should only have been upheld if it was "necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and the exclusion [was] narrowly drawn to
achieve that interest," rather than being upheld so long as it satisfied a
reasonable government interest and did not discriminate as to view-
point.1 2 Had the Utah District Court used this strict scrutiny test instead
of a reasonableness test, it would have found that Pleasant Grove City's
purported reasons for denying Summum's monument-that it did not "di-
rectly relat[e] to the history of Pleasant Grove" or wasn't "donated by
groups with long-standing ties to the Pleasant Grove community"-did
not satisfy strict scrutiny.
13
Because the Utah District Court failed to find the display of monu-
ments in Pioneer Park to be a traditional public forum, it erred in failing
to apply strict scrutiny to Pleasant Grove City's denial of Summnum's
monument. 14 Had the Utah District Court applied strict scrutiny to
Pleasant Grove City's denial of Summum's monument instead of a rea-
sonableness test, it would have found that Summum's Free Speech rights
had been violated.115 This failure led the district court to deny Sum-
mum's preliminary injunction request when it should have granted it.
16
As such, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the Utah District
Court decision with instructions to grant injunctive relief." 7 Rehearing
en banc was subsequently denied." 
8
110. Id. at 1050.
111. Id. at 1051, 1054.
112. Id. at 1051 (quoting Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678
(1992)).
113. Id. at 1047, 1051-52.
114. Id. at 1051-52.
115. See id. at 1057.
116. Id. at 1049.
117. Id. at 1057.
118. Sunmum v. Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d 1170, 1170 (10th Cir. 2007), petition for cert.
filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3289 (U.S. Nov. 20, 2007) (No. 07-665).
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D. Judge Lucero's Dissent' 19
In his dissent, Judge Lucero argued that a public park is not a tradi-
tional public forum for permanent speech just because it is a traditional
public forum for temporary speech.
120
Judge Lucero stated that the majority gave too much weight to the
"conception that city parks are 'quintessential public forums.""' 2 1 And,
while public parks are traditional public forums, they are only traditional
public forums in the sense that they derive from "a well established
common law right to assemble and speak one's mind in the com-
mons." 122 Thus, because "permanent displays do not fall within the set
of uses for which parks have traditionally been held open to the pub-
lic,' ' 123 "a park is not a traditional forum insofar as the placement of
monuments is concerned."'
124
Judge Lucero argued that in identifying the forum, the court must
look at the access sought as well as the property. 125 He stated that "[t]he
panel's claim that access 'is relevant in defining the forum, but ... does
not determine the nature of that forum,' confuses the forum analysis.'
126
"Only by defining the forum with reference to the access sought can a
court determine the nature of that forum.' 12 7 Judge Lucero then argued
that the majority in Pleasant Grove City mistakenly looked only at the
property when defining the forum when it instead should have first
looked at the access sought and then looked at the property when defin-
ing the forum.'2 8  Therefore, instead of finding that Summum sought
access to permanent speech within a public park, the Tenth Circuit ma-
jority found that Summum sought access only to a public park.
129
Judge Lucero argued that the display of monuments in Pioneer Park
is a limited public forum. 130 He noted that Pleasant Grove City had al-
lowed "a few monuments to be erected for specific purposes" where that
119. Judge McComell and Judge Gorsuch also dissented from denial en banc for reasons
concerning the Establishment Clause. Id. at 1174-75 (McConnell, J., dissenting). For purposes of
this discussion, their dissent will be omitted.
120. Id. at 1173 (Lucero, J. dissenting).





125. Id. at 1172 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800
(1985)) (Lucero, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (quoting Summum v. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d 1263, 1269 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007))
(Lucero, J., dissenting).
127. Id. (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801) (Lucero, J., dissenting).
128. See id. (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800); Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995,
1001 (10th Cir. 2002) (Lucero, J., dissenting).
129. Summum, 499 F.3d at 1172-73 (citing Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044,
1050 (10th Cir. 2007)); Duchesne, 482 F.3d at 1269 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
130. Summum, 499 F.3d at 1171 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
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right did not previously exist.' 3' He further noted that, with regard to the
display of monuments, Pleasant Grove City had not "allowed the kind of
general access or indiscriminate use of park property that is a hallmark of
a designated public forum.' ' 132 Instead, Pleasant Grove City had "created
a channel for a specific limited type of expression" that distinguished a
limited public forum.133 Having created a limited public forum for per-
manent monuments that relate to the history of Pleasant Grove City, the
government "may make reasonable content-based, but viewpoint-neutral,
decisions as to who may install monuments in [Pioneer Park].' 34
Judge Lucero's argument that the Tenth Circuit majority failed to
look at the access sought when defining the forum in Pleasant Grove
City is correct. His argument that the Tenth Circuit majority would have
found that the display of monuments in Pioneer Park was a limited public
forum had the majority looked at the access sought when defining the
forum is also correct. In fact, Judge Lucero's entire argument seems to
be correct with one minor exception.
Judge Lucero's argument is somewhat confusing because he
seemed to indicate that the appropriate property in Pleasant Grove City
is the display of monuments within Pioneer Park rather than Pioneer Park
altogether. Judge Lucero stated that the majority is incorrect when it
"asserts that the relevant forum is the entire park, regardless of the type
of access sought.' ' 35 This is correct. Then, to show that the relevant
forum is not Pioneer Park but rather the display of monuments within
Pioneer Park, Judge Lucero cited Perry as an example where "the Su-
preme Court first narrowed the forum to the mail delivery system within
a school, and only then . . . consider[ed] the nature of this forum."'
136
While Perry is correct, Judge Lucero's use of Perry may not be correct.
The problem with citing Perry here is that it makes Judge Lucero's
argument seem as if it involves map drawing rather than distinguishing
between temporary and permanent speech. By citing Perry, Judge
Lucero alludes that the display of monuments in Pioneer Park is its own
self-contained property within Pioneer Park. The problem with this is
that if the display of monuments in Pioneer Park is its own self-contained
property, then the government may only place monuments within this
131. Id. at 1174 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
132. Id. (quoting Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 915 n.13 (10th Cir. 1997) (Lucero, J.,
dissenting)).
133. Id. (quoting Child Evangelism Fellowship of Md., Inc. v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs.,
457 F.3d 376, 382 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006) (Lucero, J., dissenting)).
134. Id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)
(Lucero, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted)).
135. Id. at 1172.
136. Id.
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self-contained property and not in other places of the park. 3 7 This raises
a concern because the government should be permitted to scatter monu-
ments throughout the entire park rather than only in subsections of the
park. If, in fact, Judge Lucero is trying to argue that the display of
monuments in Pioneer Park is a subsection of Pioneer Park, his argument
is missing the main issue in Pleasant Grove City.
The main issue in Pleasant Grove City is the importance of distin-
guishing between temporary and permanent speech, not the importance
of sectioning off different parts of a traditional public forum in order to
make a limited public forum subsection. The Ninth, Second, and Sev-
enth Circuits appropriately recognize this importance.
III. OTHER CIRCUIT DECISIONS DISCUSSING STRUCTURES ON
GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
The Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuits all draw distinctions be-
tween temporary and permanent speech by discussing whether the gov-
ernment must affirmatively open a traditional public forum to struc-
tures.' 38 Moreover, by drawing distinctions between temporary and per-
manent speech, the Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuit conclude that
permanent speech is not a traditional public forum.
In Kreiser v. City of San Diego,'39 the Ninth Circuit stated that "[n]o
affirmative action is required to open a traditional public forum to a spe-
cific type of expressive activity.' 140  By stating this, the Ninth Circuit
rejected petitioner's argument that Balboa Park was not a traditional fo-
rum for "large unattended displays."'141 While this finding does not sup-
port the government's ability to limit monuments in public parks, the
Ninth Circuit did indicate in Kreiser that the City of San Diego may have
been able to close Balboa Park to "large unattended displays," but had
failed to provide sufficient evidence that it had done so.'
42
This finding supports the government's ability to limit monuments
in public parks because it draws a distinction between temporary and
permanent speech. According to the Ninth Circuit, while the government
could never close a public park to a demonstration, it may be able to
close a park to a monument. In other words, while the government could
137. Judge Lucero does argue that a court can make "conceptual distinctions" when defining a
forum. Id. This statement indicates that Judge Lucero may be trying to distinguish between tempo-
rary and permanent speech rather than advocating map drawing.
138. See generally Kreisner v. City of San Diego, 1 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 1993); Kaplan v. City of
Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1989); Lubavitch Chabad House, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 917
F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1990).
139. Kreisner, I F.3d at 775.
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not prohibit an anti-war rally in a public park, the government could pro-
hibit the erection of an anti-war monument in a public park provided that
the government was able to show that its reasons for doing so were le-
gitimate. The reason behind this distinction between a demonstration
and a monument is the impracticality of allowing all monuments in a
public park.
The Second Circuit holds that where permanent speech is con-
cerned, the forum can only be either a designated public forum or a lim-
ited public forum. 143 In Kaplan v. City of Burlington,144 the Second Cir-
cuit held that the government must affirmatively open its public parks to
permanent speech. 145 Here, the Second Circuit found that City Hall Park
was "indisputably a traditional public forum."1 46 However, it then found
that the City of Burlington "had not created a forum in City Hall Park
open to the unattended, solitary display of religious symbols.' 47 By
finding it necessary to affirmatively open property that is a traditional
public forum to monuments, the Second Circuit emphasized that there is
no implicitly held tradition of permanent speech being permitted in pub-
lic parks. In other words, because the government must act before per-
manent speech is allowed on any property, permanent speech cannot be a
traditional public forum. Rather, permanent speech must either be a des-
ignated public forum or a limited public forum.
The Seventh Circuit holds that the Free Speech Clause does not pro-
vide a constitutional right to erect a structure in a traditional public fo-
rum.' 48  In Lubavitch Chabad House, Inc. v. City of Chicago,
149
Lubavitch, a Jewish religious organization, sued the city of Chicago for
violating its Free Speech rights after the city refused to erect a menorah
in O'Hare International Airport during the holiday season. 50 Upholding
the district court's dismissal of the Lubavitch complaint, the Seventh
Circuit held that the Free Speech Clause does not guarantee the right to
erect a structure on public property.' 5' The Seventh Circuit continued:
We are not cognizant of... any private constitutional right to erect a
structure on public property. If there were, our traditional public fo-
rums, such as our public parks, would be cluttered with all manner of
structures. Public parks are certainly quintessential public forums
where Free Speech is protected, but the Constitution neither provides,
143. Kaplan, 891 F.2d at 1031.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1031 (holding that placement of a menorah in City Hall Park violated the Establish-
ment Clause).
146. Id. at 1029.
147. Id.
148. See generally Graff v. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309 (7th Cir. 1993); Lubavitch Chabad
House, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 917 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1990).
149. Lubavitch, 917 F.2d at 341.
150. Id at 342-43.
151. Id. at 347.
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nor has it ever been construed to mandate, that any person or group
be allowed to erect structures at will.
152
In other words, the Seventh Circuit held that there is no Free Speech
right to erect a monument on government property. 53 Because there is
no Free Speech right to erect a monument on government property, the
government's refusal to erect a monument cannot be a Free Speech rights
violation.
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Lubavitch coupled with the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Kreiser and the Second Circuit's holding in Kaplan
reveal that three other Circuits have not found permanent speech to be a
traditional public forum when that permanent speech is on property that
is otherwise considered a traditional public forum. Instead, the Seventh,
Second and Ninth Circuits hold that permanent speech can be a limited
public forum no matter what kind of property the permanent speech sits
on. As such, the government may refuse to place a monument on any
property so long as the reasons for doing so are reasonable and viewpoint
neutral.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit failed to distinguish between temporary and per-
manent speech in Pleasant Grove City. Because it failed to make this
distinction, it erroneously found that the display of monuments in Pio-
neer Park was a traditional public forum rather than a limited public fo-
rum. As such, the Tenth Circuit incorrectly applied strict scrutiny to
Summum's monument denial when it should have applied a reasonable-
ness test. This, in turn, created a debilitating precedent that takes away
the government's ability to control what monuments it allows in its pub-
lic parks.
A. The Type ofAccess Sought and Its Impact on Defining the Forum
The Supreme Court has held that a forum is not merely defined by
the government property at issue but also by "the particular channel of
communication" to which access is sought. 154 Moreover, the Tenth Cir-
cuit recognized in City of Ogden that determining the relevant forum
requires consideration of "(1) the government property to which access is
sought and (2) the type of access sought.' 55 In other words, one type of
speech activity may be a different forum from another type of speech
152. Id.
153. The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed this holding in Graffv. City of Chicago when it held that
the Free Speech Clause did not give someone the right to erect a newsstand on a public sidewalk.
Graff, 9 F.3d at 1314.
154. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985).
155. Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1001 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 800-02).
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activity on the same property. Cornelius and Perry illustrate this distinc-
tion.
In Cornelius, the Supreme Court found that the relevant forum was
nonpublic rather than public.' 56 The petitioners argued that the relevant
forum was public because they sought access to the federal workplace. 
5 7
However, the Court found that, although the relevant property was the
federal workplace and the federal workplace was indeed a public forum,
the petitioners had initiated their complaint because they wanted access
to the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) charity drive. 58 The Court
therefore limited its focus to the CFC charity drive rather than the federal
workplace as a whole and found that the drive had been affirmatively
created by the government and the "Government's consistent policy...
to limit participation" made it a nonpublic forum. 5 9
In Pleasant Grove City the Tenth Circuit should have found that the
relevant forum was nonpublic rather than public. Similar to Cornelius,
Summum initiated its complaint because it wanted access to the display
of monuments in Pioneer Park. 60 Had the Tenth Circuit limited its focus
to the display of monuments in Pioneer Park rather than Pioneer Park as
a whole, it would have found that the government had affirmatively cre-
ated the display and access therein was limited.
In Perry, the Supreme Court likewise found that the relevant forum
was nonpublic rather than public. 161 In Perry, the respondent, a labor
union, initiated its complaint because it wanted access to a school's mail-
ing system so that it could solicit teachers. 62 The Supreme Court found
that the system had been affirmatively created by the school and that
access was only available to school personnel and the Teachers' Un-
ion.
163
Moreover, the Court found that the school's past acts granting mail-
ing access to the Cub Scouts, YMCA, and parochial schools, only ex-
tended the constitutional right of access to other "entities of similar char-
acter." 164 Thus, while the mail facilities might be a forum open to the
Girl Scouts, local boys' club, and other similar organizations, "they
would not as a consequence be open to an organization ... concerned
with the terms and conditions of teacher employment.'
165
156. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806.
157. Id. at 800-01.
158. Id. at 793.
159. Id. at 804.
160. Summnum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1047 (10th Cir. 2007).
161. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-48 (1983).
162. Id. at41.
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In Pleasant Grove City, the government had only opened the dis-
play of monuments in Pioneer Park to those monuments that "directly
related to the history of Pleasant Grove" or to monuments that were "do-
nated by groups with long-standing ties to the Pleasant Grove commu-
nity.' 66  Thus, the display of monuments was open to other historical
monuments or groups with ties to Pleasant Grove. The display was not,
however, open to Summum's monument, which did not relate to the his-
tory of Pleasant Grove. Nor was it open to Summum, an organization
with few, if any, ties to the Pleasant Grove Community.
B. The Importance of Sumnimum v. Pleasant Grove City
Summum v. Pleasant Grove City is important because it forces the
government to either allow all monuments in its public parks or allow
none at all. This effectively denies the government from shaping the
permanent character of its parks.
As a threshold issue, Pleasant Grove City may have been engaging
in viewpoint discrimination when it denied Summum's monument. The
facts of Pleasant Grove City indicate that the government did not codify
its criteria 16 for determining whether monuments were permitted in the
display of monuments in Pioneer Park until after Summum had made its
request to erect a monument in Pioneer Park. This indicates that the
Tenth Circuit probably believed that Pleasant Grove City's reasons for
denying Summum's monument were just a fagade for viewpoint dis-
crimination. 168  And perhaps because the Tenth Circuit believed that
Pleasant Grove City had engaged in viewpoint discrimination and more
importantly believed that the Utah District Court had erred by not recog-
nizing this viewpoint discrimination, the Tenth Circuit wanted to create
an ironclad rule that would take the factfinding powers out of the hands
of lower courts when presiding over these kinds of issues. After all,
Summum v. Pleasant Grove City was the third consecutive case where
the Tenth Circuit was forced to reverse a lower court decision that had
failed to find viewpoint discrimination where there was sufficient evi-
dence to make such a finding.
169
Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit went too far with its rule to combat
viewpoint discrimination. In Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, the Tenth
Circuit held that whenever a public park is the property at issue, the fo-
166. 483 F.3d 1044, 1047 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Monuments need to have historical significance to the community or be donated by some-
one with longstanding ties to Pleasant Grove City. Id.
168. Moreover, a companion case, Summum v. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d 1263 (2007), appeared
to be obvious viewpoint discrimination even though the district court upheld the government's
action (finding possibility of viewpoint discrimination where a plot of land upon which Eagles'
monument sat in public park had been sold to a private party). Id. at 1273.
169. The previously two obviously being Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906 (10th Cir.
1997) and Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 997 (10th Cir. 2002).
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rum must be a traditional public forum, irrespective of the particular
channel of communication sought.170 As such, the government's denial
of a request for access to any speech activity in a public park is only ap-
propriate when it meets strict scrutiny.' 7' Because strict scrutiny is an
almost impossible level of scrutiny to satisfy, the government's denial of
a request for access to any speech activity in a public park will almost
never be appropriate.
While this rule is good for most speech, it is inappropriate for per-
manent speech, such as monuments, because permanent speech does not
have a long tradition of access in a public park and it unduly burdens
park property.
CONCLUSION
Following the Tenth Circuit's approach, all of our public parks will
be cluttered with monuments or void of all monuments. This all or noth-
ing approach does not give the government flexibility to distinguish its
public parks by choosing which monuments to place in them. Similarly,
this all or nothing approach effectively denies an individual or group
from having a monument erected in a public park because the govern-
ment will be hesitant to do so knowing that, by erecting one monument,
it will be opening the door to all monuments.
The real issue that concerned the Tenth Circuit in Summum v.
Pleasant Grove City, and should concern the Tenth Circuit, is viewpoint
discrimination. But, instead of Pleasant Grove City's all or nothing ap-
proach to permanent speech, the Tenth Circuit should apply a balancing
test. The balancing test would look at the government's denial of a re-
quest to access permanent speech in a public park to make sure there is
no viewpoint discrimination while at the same time allowing the gov-
ernment to establish criteria regarding which monuments will be allowed
in its public parks.
City of Ogden discusses this balancing test. There, the Tenth Cir-
cuit stated that in order to comply with the Free Speech Clause, a mu-
nicipality should employ written guidelines or a well-established practice
for determining which monuments to erect on government property.'
72
Moreover, in City of Ogden, the Tenth Circuit stated that these guidelines
had to be well established and in place before the government denied a
request to place a monument in a public park or the denial will be con-
sidered a facade for viewpoint discrimination. This balancing test is a
more specifically enumerated reasonableness test and should give the
170. Pleasant Grove, 483 F.3d at 1050.
171. Id.
172. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d at 1007.
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government the ability to control the monuments it allows in its public
parks while at the same time preventing viewpoint discrimination.
In sum, temporary speech must be distinguished from permanent
speech. While temporary speech in a public park should be treated as a
traditional public forum, permanent speech in a public park should be
treated as a limited public forum. While a content-based regulation on
temporary speech in a public park must satisfy a strict scrutiny test, a
content-based regulation on permanent speech in a public park need only
satisfy the reasonableness test in City of Ogden. A reasonableness test is
satisfied where the government's reasons for denying access to the forum
are reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Further, a denial will not be con-
sidered viewpoint neutral where the government has not employed writ-
ten guidelines or well-established practices for determining access to
government property prior to a request for access to the government
property.1
73
The Tenth Circuit should reconsider its holding in Summum v.
Pleasant Grove City to allow for a content-based regulation of permanent
speech in a public park so long as the regulation satisfies the City of
Ogden reasonableness test.
Keenan Lorenz*
173. Of course, just because these guidelines are created does not mean that a court must find
that the government's denial was viewpoint neutral.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to
thank Prof. Martin J. Katz and the Denver University Law Review board and staff for their help with
this Comment. I would also like to thank my fiancee Lindsey, parents Brian and Rosemary, and
sister Judy for their support. I would finally like to thank Kurt Vonnegut, whose writings taught me
the joy of decoding 26 letters, 10 numbers, and 8 punctuation marks.
[Vol. 85:3
